图书简介

Introduction and Precis; PART I: CONCEPTS; 1: Lying; Introduction; 1.1 My Definition of Lying; 1.I.1 Lies and Falsehoods; 1.I.2 Falsehoods and Lies; 1.I.3 A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions; 1.I.4 Lying and the Right to Know the Truth; 1.I.5 That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying; 1.I.6 Chisholm and Feehan’s Definition; 1.I.7 My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version); 1.I.8 A Defence of the Transparency Thesis; 1.I.9 The Concept of Warranting; 1.I.10 Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement; 1.I.11 Yet Another Revision; 1.I.12 A Complication of My Final Definition; 1.I.13 Some Comments on this Definition; 1.I.14 An Objection: The Concept of Assertion ; Fried; Williams; Chisholm and Feehan; 1.I.15 Reasons to Accept my Definition; 1.II Replies to Criticisms of My Definition; 1.II.1 Sorensen; 1.II.2 Fallis; Conclusions; Endnotes; 2. Deception and Related Concepts; Introduction; 2.I Deception; 2.I.2 Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition; 2.I.3 Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book; 2.II Keeping Someone in the Dark; 2.III The Relationship between Lying, Deception, Keeping Someone in the Dark, Concealing Information, and Withholding Information; 2.III.1 The Difference between Lying and Deception; 2.III.2 Deception Versus Witholding Information; 2.III.3 Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception; 2.IV Two Related Notions: Spin and Half-Truths; 2.V Bullshit; 2.V.1 Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying; 2.V.2 Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth; 2.V.3 Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive; 2.V.4 Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit; 2.V.5 Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say; 2.VI A Very Brief Note on Honesty; Endnotes; PART II: MORAL THEORY; IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY; 3. Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying; Introduction; 3.I Kant’s Categorical Imperative; 3.I.1 The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative; 3.I.2 Perfect and Imperfect Duties; 3.I.3 The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative; 3.II What Kant Says about the Morality of Lying; 3.II.1 The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); 3.II.2 Metaphysics of Morals (1797); 3.II.3 On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns; 3.II.4 Allan Wood’s Alternative Reading of On a Supposed Right...; 3.II.5 Lectures on Ethics; 3.III Does the First Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?; 3.IV Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?; 3.V A Rossian Argument for Thinking that Lying is Sometimes Morally Permissable; Conclusions; Endnotes; 4. Act-Utilitarianism; Introduction; 4.I The Definition of (Act) Utilitarianism; Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism; 4.II Guide to Action Versus Criterion of Right and Wrong; 4.III The Implications of Act-Utilitarianism for Issues of Lying and Deception; Direct Bad Consequences of Lying and Deception; Conclusions and Transition to Chapter 5; Endnotes; 5. Ross and Rule-Consequentialism; Introduction; 5.I Ross’s Theory; 5.I.1 The Concept of Prima Facie Duty; 5.I.2 Ross’s List of Prima Facie Duties; 5.I.3 Applying Ross’s Theory to Cases; 5.I.4 How Strong is the Moral Presumption against Lying?; 5.II Ross’s Criticisms of Act-Utilitarianism; 5.II.1 Ross and Utilitarianism on Promise Keeping; 5.II.2 Ross’s Arguments about Promise-Keeping Modified to Apply to Cases of Lying; 5.III Ross on the Basis of Our Knowledge of Fundamental Moral Principles; 5.III.1 Self-Evidence; 5.III.2 The Data of Ethics; 5.IV Criticisms of Ross’s View about the Basis of Moral Knowledge; 5.IV.1 Self-Evident Knowledge; 5.IV.2 The Moral Convictions of Thoughtful and Well-Educated People; 5.IV.3 A Possible Reply for Ross; 5.IV.4 Two Other Possible Lines for Ross to Take; 5.V Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialism; 5.V.1 Hooker’s Theory; 5.V.2 Hooker’s Arguments for Rule Consequentialism; 5.V.3 Problems with Hooker’s Arguments; 5.VI Conclusions to Chapters 3-5 and Transition to Chapter 6; Endnotes; IIB MORAL REASONING; 6. The Golden Rule and a Theory of Moral Reasoning; Introduction; 6.I Rationality Conditions for Moral Judgements and Moral Judges; 6.I.1 Consistency; 6.I.2 Being Adequately Informed; 6.I.3 Proper Cognitive Functioning; 6.II The Golden Rule; 6.II.1 Proof of the Golden Rule; 6.II.2 Defense of Premises 1, 1a, 1b, and 1c; 6.II.3 Defense of Premises 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c; 6.III The Force of Golden Rule Arguments; An Example; 6.IV Objections to the Golden Rule; 6.IV.1 When are Differences Morally Relevant?; 6.IV.2 Masochists and People with Unusual Preferences; 6.IV.3 Punishing People and Doing Things that they Do Not Want One to Do; 6.IV.4 People who are Depressed and Do Not Care what Happens to them; 6.V Applications: Rational Consistent Moral Judges Will All Agree in their Judgements about Certain Issues; 6.V.1 Nazis; 6.V.2 Fraud; 6.V.3 Another Case of Fraud; 6.V.4 Ethical Egoism; 6.VI Why be Consistent?; Question 1; Question 2; An Objection; 6.VII Moral Nihilism/Amoralism (Opting out of Moral Discourse); 6.VII.1 Consistency Arguments Only Apply to People Who Make Moral Judgements; 6.VII.2 Reasons to Accept Morality; 6.VII.3 A Reservation; 6.VIII A Note on R. M. Hare; 6.IX Limitations/Caveats; Endnotes; IIC THE IMPLICATIONS OF IIA AND IIB FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT LYING AND DECEPTION; 7. The Partial Overlap/Convergence of Reasonable Views; Introduction; 7.I What Rationality/Consistency Tests can and cannot Show; An Objection; 7.II Absolutism; 7.III Reflective Equilibrium; 7.IV The Implications of these Results for the Rest of the Book; Endnotes; PART III: APPLICATIONS; 8. Deception and Withholding Information on Sales; Introduction; Caveat Emptor; 8.I The Obligations of Salespeople; 8.I.1 My View; 8.I.2 A Justification for My View; A Qualification; An Objection; Reply; The Justification of Duties 5 and 6; 8.II Case Studies; 8.II.1 Deception in Sales; Case 1: The Sales Tactics of the Holland Furnace Company; Case 2: Falsifying an Odometer; Case 3: College Admissions; Case 4: Shoe Sales; What about Cases in Which a Person Benefits by Being Deceived?; Case 5: Paternalistic Deception; 8.II.2 WithHolding Information in Sales; Case 1: Health Insurance; Case 2: Steering Customers; Case 3: Withholding Information about Defects; Endnotes; 9. Deception in Advertising; Introduction; 9.I Deceptive Advertising; 9.I.1 The Harmfulness of Deceptive Advertising: Case Studies; Sears Dishwasher; Listerine; Vioxx; R. J. Reynolds; 9.I.2 The Wrongness of Deceptive Advertising; 9.II Why Following the Law is not Enough; 9.II.1 The FTC’s Definition of Deceptive Advertising; 9.II.2 Why it’s not Enough to Follow the Law; 9.III Two Objections; 9.III.1 Cases of Small Harms to Many People; 9.III.2 What if Being Honest gives Dishonest Competitors an Advantage?; Endnotes; 10. Bluffing and Deception in Negotiations; Introduction; 10.I What is Bluffing?; 10.II The Economics of Bluffing; 10.III Is it Morally Permissible to Misstate One’s Negotiating Position?; An Objection; 10.IV Applying the Principle of Self-Defense; An Objection; Replies; A Related Objection; Endnotes; 11. Honesty, Professionals, and the Vulnerability of the Public; Introduction; 11.I The Frequent Incentive/Temptation to Deceive Clients; 11.II Information Disclosure and Professional Obligations; 11.III Informed Consent; Exceptions; Endnotes; 12. Lying and Deception about Questions of War and Peace: Case Studies; Introduction; 12.I Lying and Deception in Order to Create a Justification or Pretext for War; 12.I.1 Hearst and the Spanish American War; 12.I.2 Franklin Roosevelt and World War II; 12.I.3 Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; 12.II Another Case: George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and the Iraq War of 2003; 12.II.1 Claims About Iraq’s Weapons of Mass-Destruction; 12.II.2 Claims About the Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda; 12.II.3 The Falsity of Claims about Iraq’s Weapons and its Connections with Al Qaeda; 12.II.4 Reasons to Think that Some of the Claims about Iraq’s Weapons and Ties to Al Qaeda Constituted Lying or (Attempted) Deception; 12.II.5 Lying and Deception about Other Matters Related to the Iraq War; 12.III A Case of Lying/Deception to Avoid War?; 12.IV A Moral Assessment of (Some of) the Cases; 12.IV.1 Lyndon Johnson; 12.IV.2 Bush and Cheney; 12.IV.3 Over-optimism as a Major Cause of Wars; 12.IV.4 Franklin Roosevelt; 12.IV.5 Acheson, Dulles, and Eisenhower; Endnotes; 13. Honesty, Conflicts, and the Telling of History: More Case Studies; Introduction; 13.I Germany, World War I, and the Myth of the Stab in the Back; American Versions of the Dolchstosslegenge?; 13.II Rewriting History; 13.II.1 Feel-Good Confederate History and the Post-Civil War South; 13.II.2 Lying About the Crimes of Joseph Stalin; 13.II.3 An Objection; 13.III Half-Truths and Group Conflict; 13.III.1 Half-Truths; 13.III.2 Examples of Harmful Half-Truths; The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; The US and Iran; Hitler and Germany’s Suffering after WWI; 13.III.3 Half-Truths in Personal Relations; 13.IV Intellectual Honesty; Endnotes; 14. Honesty as a Virtue; Introduction; 14.I Dissenters from Conventional Wisdom; 14.I.1 Lying, Deception, and Privacy; 14.I.2 Lying, Honesty, and Interpersonal Conflicts; 14.I.3 Lying, Deception, and Self-Esteem; 14.II In What Sense Honesty is and is not a Virtue; Endnotes; Bibliography; Index

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